Sprague also began to change course toward the south developments would ultimately force him toward the southwest. Sprague also launched fighters and bombers, which, although armed for their original close air support and ASW missions, could at least harass Taffy 3’s pursuers. Sprague, also launched some aircraft, but would be faced with other challenges as the day progressed. Taffy 1, commanded by Rear Admiral Thomas L. Stump, was able to support Taffy 3 with its aircraft as the battle progressed. Although its escorts were bound to protect the slow, unarmored escort carriers, Taffy 2, commanded by Rear Admiral Felix B. At this point, Taffy 3’s sister task units, Taffy 1 and Taffy 2 (TG 77.4.1 and TG 77.4.2) were approximately 25 nautical miles to the southeast and had adopted a southeasterly course. His destroyers generated a smoke screen and, Johnston in the lead, began firing at their pursuers. By this time, Sprague had his carriers come about and initially followed a southeasterly course. Later, Taffy 3 personnel were to remark on the brightly colored geysers thrown up by the salvos of near-misses that were caused by the spotting dye added to Japanese shells. Shortly after, Kurita ordered his forces to engage and Yamato, followed by other Japanese ships, opened fire. Taffy 3’s first contact with Kurita’s force was a visual sighting of antiaircraft fire to the northwest, immediately followed by a surface search radar “hit” and intercepted Japanese voice transmissions. It would have the effect of committing the Japanese ships in a piecemeal fashion and dispersing their overwhelming firepower during the upcoming battle. Due to still-ongoing shift from nighttime to daylight antiaircraft dispositions, this order inadvertently led to confusion. Center Force’s commander, Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, immediately ordered his ships to move into a pursuit formation. task force of carriers and cruisers on the eastern horizon, thought to be part of the U.S. Additional air contacts followed and were fired on until 0650, when the Japanese sighted what appeared to them to be a large U.S. At 0623, shortly after sunrise and before the task force had fully shifted to its circular daytime anti-aircraft formation, Yamato made radar contact with U.S. (See images of these vessels in "The Ships of TG 77.4.3") The Battleįollowing its San Bernardino Strait passage, the Japanese Center Force was still in its nighttime search disposition. Taffy 3 was comprised of the following ships: Sprague’s TG 77.4.3-call sign “Taffy 3”-the northwesterly-most task unit, made up of six small escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts, was stunned to confront four Japanese battleships (among them Yamato with her 18-inch main guns), six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 11 destroyers. Just after sunrise on 25 October, Rear Admiral Clifton A. This left only three Seventh Fleet escort carrier (CVE) task units on the northern flank of the Leyte operational area, where they had been providing close air support and an ASW screen for the amphibious landings. Seventh Fleet were engaged to the south of Leyte Gulf. The heavy forces of Vice Admiral Thomas C. The Japanese Northern Force, a carrier task force, had drawn Admiral William F. However, the task force ultimately resumed its eastward passage, broke out of the San Bernardino Strait north of Samar early the following day, and headed southward toward Leyte Gulf. Following the 24 October Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the powerful Japanese First Diversion Attack Force (“Center Force”) appeared to be retiring westward. On 15 October 1944, the Japanese Imperial Navy’s First Mobile Fleet launched Operation Shō, a last-ditch attempt to engage Allied naval forces off Leyte in the central Philippines decisively.
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